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Flawed by Design?
A Case Study of Federal Enforcement of
Migrant Workers' Labour Rights in Canada
SarahMarsden,* Eric Tucker** & Leah F. Vosko***
Although Canada'smigrant labourprograms are seen by some as models
of best practices, rights shortfalls and exploitation of workers are well documented. Through migration policy, federal authorities determine who can hire
migrant workers and the conditions under which they are employed, through the
provision of work permits. Despite its authority over work permits, the federal
government has historicallyhad little to do with the regulationof working conditions. In 2015, the federal government introduceda new regulatoryenforcement
system - unique internationallyfor its attempt to enforce migrants' workplace
rights throughfederal migrationpolicy - under which employers must comply
with contractualemployment terms, uphold provincial workplace standards,
and make efforts to maintain a workplace free of abuse. Drawing on enforcement data, andfrontline law andpolicy documents, we critically assess the new
enforcement system, concluding that, because of designflaws and implementation failures, it does not realize its potentialto protect workers' rights.

1.

INTRODUCTION

Canada is home to a longstanding and expansive temporary migrant worker program. Migrant workers 1 in Canada provide

* Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University.
** Osgoode Hall Law School, York University; Distinguished Scholar in Residence,
Cleveland Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University.
*** Political Science, York University.
Authorship is listed alphabetically to reflect equal contribution.
1 We use the term "migrant worker" to refer in general to workers in Canada without permanent residency status. In principle, this group includes undocumented
workers, but because our study is focused on documented workers, the term has
this more limited meaning herein. Documented migrant workers enter Canada
under two programs: the Temporary Foreign Worker Program (TFWP) and the
International Mobility Program (IMP). We refer to workers in the TFWP as
TFWs. All TFWs fall within the inspection program. Only some workers migrating under the IMP (those requiring closed work permits) fall within the ambit of
the program. Our focus is TFWs, but, where appropriate, we indicate when we
are also referring to covered IMP workers.
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essential labour in response to "labour shortages," including in key
occupations and sectors unattractive to native-born workers and
permanent residents on the terms and conditions offered by employers. As observed by Sharma, the concept of "labour shortage" is
qualitative: the demand is not for labour generally, but specifically for
labour in conditions and for rates of pay that Canadian citizens and
permanent residents will not accept. 2 Industries with a high proportion of migrant workers include agriculture, caregiving and domestic
work, retail, and construction.
Canada's federal government regulates migrant labour through
immigration law and policy, under which state authorities determine
who can hire migrant workers and the conditions under which they
may be employed, by way of granting permission to employers to hire
migrant workers and granting work permits to the workers themselves.
Elements of Canada's migrant work programs are often touted
as "best practice" examples, 3 yet worker exploitation and rights shortfalls are well documented within various components of Canada's
migrant labour programs. 4 Evidence suggests that exploitation is
most acute among those engaged in low-skilled jobs, tied partly to the
dirty, dangerous, and demeaning work they perform (e.g., agricultural

&

2 Nandita Sharma, Home Economics: Nationalism and the Making of "Migrant
Workers" in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2006) at 98, 108.
3 Jenna L Hennebry & Kerry Preibisch, "A Model for Managed Migration?
Re-Examining Best Practices in Canada's Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Program" (2012) 50:S 1 Int'l Migration J 19 at 23.
4 See, e.g., Luin Goldring & Patricia Landolt, eds, Producing and Negotiating
Non-Citizenship: PrecariousLegal Status in Canada (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2013); Judy Fudge & Fiona MacPhail, "The Temporary Foreign
Worker Program in Canada: Low-Skilled Workers as an Extreme Form of
Flexible Labour" (2009) 31:5 Comp Lab L & Pol'y J 101; Kendra Strauss
Siobhan McGrath, "Temporary Migration, Precarious Employment and Unfree
Labour Relations: Exploring the 'Continuum of Exploitation' in Canada's
Temporary Foreign Worker Program" (2017) 78 Geoforum 199; Kerry Preibisch
& Gerardo Otero, "Does Citizenship Status Matter in Canadian Agriculture?
Workplace Health and Safety for Migrant and Immigrant Laborers" (2014) 79:2
Rural Sociology 174; Leah F Vosko, Eric Tucker & Rebecca Casey, "Enforcing
Employment Standards for Migrant Agricultural Workers in Ontario, Canada:
Exposing Underexplored Layers of Vulnerability" (2019) 35:2 Intl J Comp Lab
L & Ind Rel 227.
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workers and caregivers).5 Some of the exploitive practices violate
applicable legislated minimum standards that are primarily regulated
by provincial/territorial law. These include employment standards
(e.g., minimum wage, overtime, etc.), occupational health and safety
regulation (e.g., the provision of proper safety equipment), and
human rights (e.g., non-discrimination on the basis of gender, race/
ethnicity). Other rights shortfalls arise from a failure to fulfill the
terms attached to the closed work permit (e.g., the work not being
performed for the employer specified, the work being of a different
nature than that described in the initial job offer). These shortfalls are
amplified by the limited labour mobility and deportability of temporary foreign workers (TFWs), and conditions that create structures of
vulnerability and unfreedom which make it particularly risky to voice
complaints. 6 While the data used for the present study predates the
COVID-19 pandemic, researchers and advocacy groups have noted
how rights shortfalls, and the persistent failure of governments to provide adequate protection and enforcement measures, have contributed
to the severity of outbreaks and the death rate among migrant workers, particularly in agriculture. 7 The pandemic thereby highlights the
urgent need for structural reform that priotitizes effective worker

-

5 See Sedef Arat-Koc, "'Good Enough to Work but Not Good Enough to Stay':
Foreign Domestic Workers and the Law" in Elizabeth Comack, Locating Law:
Race/Class/GenderConnect (Halifax: Fernwood Publishing, 1999) at 125;
Tanya Basok, "Free to Be Unfree: Mexican Guest Workers in Canada" (1999)
32:2 Lab Cap & Soc 192 at 204; Jenna Hennebry, "Permanently Temporary?
Agricultural Migrant Workers and Their Integration in Canada" (2012) 26
Institute for Research on Public Policy 1 at 22; Kerry Preibisch, "Pick-YourOwn Labor: Migrant Workers and Flexibility in Canadian Agriculture" (2010)
44:2 IMR at 415.
6 See Todd Gordon, "Capitalism, Neoliberalism, and Unfree Labour" (2019) 45:6
Critical Sociology 921 at 924; Robert Miles, Capitalism and Unfree Labour:
Anomaly or Necessity (London: Tavistock, 1987).
7 See e.g., Migrant Workers' Alliance for Change, "Report: Unheeded Warnings
COVID-19 & Migrant Workers in Canada" (2020) online: <https://migrantworkers
alliance.org/unheededwarnings>; Migrant Worker Health Expert Working
Group, "Recommendations for Overcoming Health Challenges Faced By
Migrant Agricultural Workers during the COVID-19-Virus Pandemic" (2020),
online (pdf): <http://www.migrantworker.ca/wp-content/uploads/2020/06/June9-2020-HC-recommendations.pdf>.
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protection, an issue to which we return with specific recommendations in the Discussion section of this paper, in Part 4 below.
Despite evidence of these challenges and the manner in which
legal and policy structures serve to entrench migrant worker vulnerability, the federal government has historically had little to do with
the regulation of working conditions for migrant workers. Rather,
employment standards, occupational health and safety, and human
rights fall largely within provincial/territorial authority. Migrant
workers are covered by these laws, but their deportability, limited
labour mobility, and the prevalence of complaint-based systems for
redress tend to limit their enforcement. Consequently, while the federal immigration system created structures of vulnerability, historically the government has disclaimed responsibility for addressing the
resulting labour rights violations and instead exercised its powers
solely to protect Canadian jobs and the domestic labour market.8
The government's refusal to exercise its powers for the protection of migrant workers began to change in 2011 with the introduction
of a very limited employer compliance review process. However, it
was only in 2015 that the federal government created an enforcement
regime that, for the first time, required employers to comply with
basic labour standards and the terms of migrant workers' contracts as
a condition of hiring migrant workers. 9
Like Canada's labour migration program, the federal enforcement system may come to be considered externally, including by other
states, as a model policy for protecting migrant workers. With this in
mind, we provide the first analysis of this new system. We draw on
program statistics, federal enforcement data, and operational policy

8 See Bridget Anderson, "Migration, Immigration Controls and the Fashioning
of Precarious Workers" (2010) 24:2 Work Employ & Soc 300 at 301; Mimi
Zou, "The Legal Construction of Hyper-Dependence and Hyper-Precarity in
Migrant Work Relations" (2015) 31:2 Int'l J Comp Lab L & Ind Rel 141 at 144,
149; Chris F Wright, Dimitria Groutsis & Diane van den Broek, "EmployerSponsored Temporary Labour Migration Schemes in Australia, Canada and
Sweden: Enhancing Efficiency, Compromising Fairness?" (2017) 43:11 J Ethnic
& Migration Stud 1854 at 1859.
9 See Sarah Marsden, Eric Tucker & Leah F Vosko, "Federal Enforcement of
Migrant Workers' Labour Rights in Canada: A Research Report" (2020) SSRN
Electronic J, online: <papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3601870>
at 3.
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materials we obtained through freedom of information requests,
alongside legislation, regulations, and case law to provide a comprehensive view of the regulatory structure and the policy by which
frontline officers interpret and apply the new system.10 We evaluate
the federal enforcement system, taking into account an extensive
enforcement literature on the efficacy of different styles of regulatory
enforcement systems for securing meaningful employer compliance
with labour standards, as well as the particular vulnerabilities that
result from migrant workers' precarious immigration status. We conclude that the extreme compliance orientation and practice of federal
enforcement, in conjunction with other design flaws, undermine the
protective potential of the new system.
The article progresses as follows. We begin by documenting the
recent growth and proliferation of temporary migration programs in
Canada and explain why we focus on the federal enforcement scheme
created for the Temporary Foreign Worker Program. Next, we
describe the sources of labour rights for migrant workers, and explain
the legal basis and role of the federal scheme. We then critically
examine the design and implementation of the scheme, identifying
features that, we argue, undermine its efficacy. Finally, drawing on an
international enforcement literature, we explain in greater detail why
those features, and especially the regime's compliance orientation,
limit its potential to better protect migrant workers' labour rights.
However, before turning to these matters, it is necessary to offer
a brief overview of the major enforcement regimes we discuss in
greater detail in the Discussion in Part 4, where we also assess their
efficacy. In early scholarly debates over models of enforcement, a
central debate pivoted on whether regulators should pursue deterrence
or compliance. 1 The deterrence model is premised on the notion that
employers are rational actors whose behaviour is significantly shaped
by a comparison between the costs and benefits of violating the law.
The regulator, therefore, must convince employers that the risk of

10 Policy and enforcement data were not available for dates past 2018 at the time of
writing, due in part to extensive delays in the processing of Access to Information
requests by federal agencies. Those interested in more detailed data analysis than
presented here should consult our research report: ibid.
11 For example, see John Braithwaite, To Punishor Persuade:Enforcement of Coal
Mine Safety (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985).
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detection and the resulting penalties will be more costly than any
benefits they would gain by violating the law. Specific deterrence
of particular employers also leads to general deterrence when other
employers generally become aware that their violations may be
detected and punished.
The compliance model, by contrast, is premised on the idea that
most violations are the result of ignorance or incompetence, so that
the first response to detected violations should be to offer compliance
assistance, and direction, rather than to impose a punishment. 12 It therefore involves the engagement of strategies prioritizing the provision of
information, persuasion, and negotiation in order to bring employer
practices into compliance with the law. Strongly aligned with the
emergence of the regulatory new governance paradigm,1 3 which views
the proper role of government as steering rather than rowing,1 4 arrangements that disperse regulatory activity among state actors, employers,
and employees are integral to the compliance model.
Beyond such influences and emphases, several key features
characterize this model of enforcement: first, it is based on a reactive
approach to violations stemming primarily from employee-initiated
complaints, which makes complainants responsible for asserting their
rights; second, a compliance model seeks efficiency in the processing
of complaints and takes speedy resolution as a central indicator of
success; and, third, the model encourages escalating penalties only
among those employers deemed to be the most incalcitrant, pursuing
punitive interventions, such as heavy administrative or monetary fines,
or formal prosecutions, in only the most egregious and rare cases."

12 For example, see Keith Hawkins, Environment and Enforcement (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1984).
13 For example, see Orly Lobel, "Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations"
(2005) 57:4 Admin L Rev 1071 at 1143.
14 For example, see Leah F Vosko, Mark P Thomas & John Grundy, "Challenging
New Governance: Evaluating New Approaches to Employment Standards
Enforcement in Common Law Jurisdictions" (2016) 37:2 Economic & Industrial
Democracy 373 at 374.
15 Leah F Vosko, Andrea M Noack & Eric Tucker, Employment Standards
Enforcement: A Scan of Employment Standards Complaints and Workplace
Inspections and their Resolution under the Employment StandardsAct, 2000,
Research Projects Commissioned to Support the Changing Workplaces Review
(Toronto: Ontario Ministry of Labour, 2016).
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In more recent years, theorists have tried to go beyond the
punish-or-persuade debate by thinking about how these strategies
might be combined. Many models, taking up a range of issues and
often characterized by gradations of deterrence and compliance, have
been proposed. 16 Here we focus on two that have achieved prominence, namely, responsive regulation and strategic enforcement.
Responsive regulation is premised on the view that most violations
are inadvertent and, thus, regulators should begin by offering compliance assistance. However, if firms do not respond to this assistance,
regulators should escalate their responses up an enforcement pyramid
until the firm comes into line.1 7 Strategic enforcement, by contrast,
focuses on four principles that are seen as foundational to the design
of an enforcement scheme: prioritization, deterrence, sustainability,
and systemic effects. Prioritization entails the identification of areas
where violations are likely to be widespread or severe; deterrence is
seen as an essential component of enforcement; sustainability aims
at achieving lasting effects; and systemic effects require an understanding of the more fundamental problems driving violations and the
development of responses that are responsive to those drivers. 18
2.

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF TEMPORARY MIGRATION

IN CANADA: PATTERNS AND TRENDS
As has been the case within the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) overall, the orientation of
Canada's migration policy has seen a movement away from the postSecond World War emphasis on permanent immigration, and towards

16 For a survey, see Neil Gunningham, "Enforcement and Compliance Strategies"
in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave & Martin Lodge, The Oxford Handbook of
Regulation (Oxford University Press, 2010) 120 [Gunningham, "Enforcement"].
17 Ian Ayres & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the
DeregulationDebate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 35-40.
18 David Weil, "A Strategic Approach to Labour Inspection" (2008) 147:4 Int'l Lab
Rev 349 [Weil, "Strategic Approach"].
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an emphasis on temporary migration for employment. 19 Indeed, from
2009 to the present, total temporary migration for employment grew
steadily, with the number of temporary work permits for work purposes (i.e., excluding refugees and people awaiting permanent status)
exceeding admissions to permanent residency for economic reasons. 2 0

Just over 300,000 (302,821) temporary migrant workers signed
permits in 2017 (up from 116,540 in 2000), but Canada granted
permanent status to just 159,262 (economic class) immigrants that
year (up from 136,287 in 2000); temporary migrants thus went from
representing 46% to 66% of total economic migrants between 2000
and 2017.21
Non-residents wishing to work in Canada are required to obtain
work permits that fall into two broad categories. In the first category,
permits are issued under the Temporary Foreign Worker Program
(TFWP). These permits cover positions for which a Labour Market
Impact Assessment (LMIA) - the labour market test - is required.
All of these permits limit the worker to working for a specific
employer, for a specified time period, in a named role. They are often

19 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, International
Migration Outlook, 42 (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2018) at 25-27; Salimah
Valiani, "The Shifting Landscape of Contemporary Canadian Immigration
Policy: The Rise of Temporary Migration and Employer-Driven Immigration"
in Luin Goldring & Patricia Landolt, eds, Producing and Negotiating NonCitizenship:PrecariousLegal Status in Canada(Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2013) 55 at 56.
20 On an annual basis, Canada admits tens of thousands of immigrants as permanent residents under family and humanitarian classes; however, the majority of
permanent residents arriving annually enter under the "Economic Class." These
migrants receive permanent residency on such bases as their skill level, occupation, and/or financial investments. Permanent residents migrating on economic
grounds are nevertheless being outpaced by those on temporary work permits.
See Immigration, Refugees & Citizenship Canada, "Immigration Overview
- Permanent Residents" (2016) at 4, online (pdf): <www.cic.gc.ca/opendatadonneesouvertes/data/Facts_and_Figures_ 2016_PR_EN.pdf>; Immigration,
Refugees & Citizenship Canada, "2018 Annual Report to Parliament on
Immigration" (2018) at 15, 29, online (pdf): <www.canada.ca/content/dam/ircc/
migration/ircc/english/pdf/pub/annual-report-2018.pdf>.
21 See Leah F Vosko, Disrupting Deportability: Transnational Workers
Organize (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2019) at 142 [Vosko, Disrupting
Deportability].
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described as "closed" or "bonded" work permits, as the worker is not
authorized to work in any other positions, or for any other employers, than those listed on their permit. Such permits are potentially
available to any employer and for any type of work, provided the
employer can meet the labour market test. Historically, however,
the largest groups of workers have been in agricultural and domestic
work pursuant to specific sub-programs of the TFWP.22 In order for
a worker to change employers, the prospective new employer must
obtain another LMIA, which is an employer-initiated process, beyond
the control of the worker.
The second broad category of temporary work permits falls
within the International Mobility Program (IMP), which comprises
those entering Canada pursuant to international agreements, working
holidaymakers, spouses of high-skilled workers, and post-graduate
work permit holders, among other groups. Unlike the TFWP, employers do not need to obtain an LMIA in order to hire a worker under
the IMP. Most migrant workers entering under IMP sub-programs
have open work permits and are not subject to an inspection system.
However, approximately one-third of those participating in the IMP
hold closed work permits, tied to a single employer, a specific occupation, and a location.23

22 One stream within the TFWP is designed specifically for caregivers who,
unlike other workers in this stream, are given a pathway to permanent residency. Recently, the government announced it planned to provide caregivers
with sectoral rather than employer-specific permits. See Immigration, Refugees
& Citizenship Canada, "Caregivers Will Now Have Access to New Pathways to
Permanent Residence" (News Release, 23 February 2019), online: <https://www.
canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/news/2019/02/caregivers-willnow-have-access-to-new-pathways-to-permanent-residence.html>.
23 See Regulatory Impact Analysis Statement, Regulations Amending the
Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations (15 December 2018) C Gaz
I, vol 152, no 50, online: <http://www.gazette.gc.ca/rp-pr/pl/2018/2018-12-15/
html/regl-eng.html>. IMP participants with closed work permits are subject to
an inspection system parallel to that covering the TFWP, but enforced by IRCC
rather than ESDC. See also Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations,
SOR/2002-227, s 209.2(1) [IRPR]. IRCC was formerly known as Citizenship
and Immigration Canada (CIC).
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The total number of IMP participants almost tripled between
2005 and 2017, whereas the number of TFWP participants declined
precipitously from 2013 to 2017, after stabilizing at high levels
between 2007 to 2013. Despite the greater growth of the IMP 24 and
increasing concerns about the contours of certain sub-programs, in
this article we focus on TFWs and the inspection system that governs their employment because of the magnitude of evidence of their
vulnerability generally, and also that of a highly precarious subset
- those in agriculture - whose numbers are growing despite the
contraction of other sub-programs of the TFWP. 25 On the other hand,
migrant workers participating in the IMP are a heterogeneous group,
with different degrees of vulnerability that are difficult to document. 26
3.
(a)

THE FEDERAL ENFORCEMENT SYSTEM
Sources of Labour Rights for Migrant Workers:
Connecting Federal Immigration Powers to Provincial/
Territorial Jurisdiction over Protective Standards

The new enforcement system takes its place in the context
of multiple, sometimes overlapping, sources of workplace rights
for migrant workers, shaped in part by the division of powers in
Canada's federalist system. Under the Canadian constitution, the

24 Leah F Vosko "Temporary Labour Migration by Any Other Name: Differential
Inclusion under Canada's 'New' International Mobility Regime" (2020) J Ethnic
& Migration Stud at 5.
25 See Leah F Vosko, Eric Tucker & Rebecca Casey, "Enforcing Employment
Standards for Migrant Agricultural Workers in Ontario, Canada: Exposing
Underexplored Layers of Vulnerability" (2019) 35:2 Int'l J Comp Lab L & Ind
Rel 227 at 228, 231, 234; Vosko, DisruptingDeportability,supra note 21 at 27;
Daiva Stasiulis, "Elimi(Nation): Canada's 'Post-Settler' Embrace of Disposable
Migrant Labour" (2020) 14:1 Stud Soc Justice 22 at 24 & 26.
26 See Eric M Tucker, "Migrant Workers and Fissured Workforces: CS Wind and
the Dilemmas of Organizing Intra-Company Transfers in Canada" (2017) 41:2
Economic & Industrial Democracy 372 at 373.
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federal government exercises paramount jurisdiction over immigration. 27 Labour and employment law is largely a matter of provincial
or territorial jurisdiction, and applies to the overwhelming majority of
migrant workers, although there are significant barriers to meaningful
protection for migrant workers under these laws. 28 Paramount federal
jurisdiction over immigration does not empower the federal government to override provincial or territorial jurisdiction over labour and
employment. However, the federal government's immigration jurisdiction does allow it to set conditions for employers who hire migrant
workers that must be included in an offer of employment. These
terms may be more generous than minimum standards established by
applicable workplace laws but may not be lower. Immigration law
thus provides migrant workers with a further source of workplace

27 See Constitution Act, 1867 (UK), 30 & 31 Vict, c 3, s 95. Provincial governments have recently assumed a more active role in the selection of immigrants,
but not in the enforcement of immigration regulations. For a discussion, see
Mireille Paquet, "The Federalization of Immigration and Integration in Canada"
(2014) 47:3 CJPS 519 at 520; Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, "Immigration
Federalism in Canada: Provincial and Territorial Nominee Programs (PTNPs)"
in Sasha Baglay & Delphine Nakache, eds, Immigration Regulation in Federal
States (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014) 95. While limitations of space and scope
inhibit us from providing an analysis of the relationship between Indigenous
sovereignty and Canadian law here, it nevertheless bears mentioning that
Canadian immigration law was developed as a fundamental component of
territorial and cultural colonization. Like much of Canada's legal system, its
development is linked to the dispossession, murder, violence against, and forced
assimilation of Indigenous peoples. Indigenous legal systems exist throughout
the territory claimed by Canada, and serious questions exist as to the legitimacy
of the Canadian state to exert control over this territory, particularly in those
parts neither ceded nor subject to treaty. See e.g. Amar Bhatia, "We Are All
Here to Stay? Indigeneity, Migration, and 'Decolonizing' the Treaty Right to be
Here" (2013) 31:2 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 39; Soma Chatterjee,
"Immigration, Anti-Racism, and Indigenous Self-Determination: Towards
a Comprehensive Analysis of the Contemporary Settler Colonial" (2018)
25:5 Social Identities 644; Laura Madokoro, "On future research directions:
Temporality and permanency in the study of migration and settler colonialism in
Canada" (2019) 17:1 History Compass 1 at 4.
28 Federal jurisdiction over labour and employment is limited to only 6-10% of
Canada's private-sector labour force, and few migrant workers are employed in
the federally regulated sector.
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rights, which was underutilized until the implementation of the new
enforcement system.
Two federal agencies are directly involved in regulating migrant
labour: Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) and
Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). ESDC provides permission to employers to hire migrant workers if the employer
can demonstrate that hiring a migrant worker will have a neutral or
positive impact on the Canadian labour market. 29 Once an employer
obtains a positive LMIA, it may make an offer of employment to a
migrant worker, who can then apply for a work permit from IRCC.
The offer of employment must describe the job duties, rate of pay,
and working conditions, as approved in the LMIA. An employer's
failure to provide wages and working conditions that are substantially the same as - but not less favourable than - those laid out in
the offer constitutes non-compliance with the employer's obligations
under immigrationlaw.
Until recently, the federal power to regulate the employers of
migrant workers was used solely for protectionist purposes to impose
conditions restricting the employment of migrant workers, and not
for protective purposes to prevent or remediate abusive treatment of
migrant workers. The new federal inspection system requires employers not only to meet the terms of LMIAs, but also to comply with
applicable workplace laws and make reasonable efforts to provide an
abuse-free workplace. The latter two obligations created new federally enforceable workplace rights not previously found in LMIAs.3 0
To summarize, TFWs have several overlapping sources of
labour rights:
-

-

Labour and Employment Law
- Provincial/territorial labour and employment laws, including
both statutory and judge-made (common) law (or the federal government's laws for those employed in the federal
jurisdiction).
Immigration Law (Federal)
- The terms of the positive LMIA and offer of employment,
which may not be inferior to legislated employment standards;

29 See IRPR, supra note 23, s 203.
30 Ibid, s 209.3(1)(a)(v).
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The right to have their employer make reasonable efforts to
provide an abuse-free workplace (pursuant to the Immigration
and Refugee ProtectionRegulations (IRPR)); and

"

For the Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program (SAWP), the
standard contract arising from interstate agreements, which
may add to, but may not derogate from, legislated minimum
standards.

This brings us to the question of rights enforcement. Under Canada's
federal structure, provinces/territories have exclusive jurisdiction over
the enforcement of their laws. However, because immigration regulations now require employers to comply with provincial standards,
ESDC has the power to treat the violation of provincial standards as
immigration law violations and take enforcement action. As noted
above, this is a recent development. In 2011 law and policy changed
to grant ESDC and IRCC the power to actively review employers of
migrant workers. Initially, when this power was exercised through
paper-based Employer Compliance Reviews (ECRs), few employers
faced sanctions. However, in 2015, the federal government implemented a further set of regulatory changes, creating much broader
enforcement and inspection powers for ESDC3 1 - the enforcement
system that is the central subject of this analysis.
While our inquiry is concerned primarily with the enforcement
of labour rights, or the protective role, this system also enforces the
terms of LMIAs that restrict migrant workers' labour market freedom so that they can be employed only in the same occupational
category, location and business for which their employer received an
LMIA. The scheme is thus designed both to enforce the protectionist
restrictions that construct migrant workers' juridical unfreedom, and
the protective standards that aim to shield migrant workers from the
labour rights violations and workplace abuse that they experience
disproportionately because of their unfree status.32

31 A parallel enforcement system by the IRCC was created to enforce the closed
work permits and workplace rights of workers in the IMP with closed work
permits.
32 See Gordon, supra note 6 at 922; Miles, supra note 6.
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The Design and Practice of Enforcement

The creation of a federal enforcement system holds the promise
of significantly reducing the burden of labour rights violations suffered by TFWs. Ideally, we would like to be able to measure how the
burden of violations has changed over time, but enforcement studies,
including ours, suffer from an inability to know what is not detected.
Therefore, we have adopted the strategy of identifying weaknesses
in the design and implementation of the federal enforcement system that unduly limit the ambit of inspectors' powers and produce
a compliance-based system that is less effective in achieving its
protective goals than a deterrence- and strategic enforcement-based
system would be.
We develop our argument in two steps. First, we analyze the
design and practice of the enforcement system. We begin by examining the regulations creating it and the directives given to frontline
enforcement officials. Second, we consider how frontline officers
have exercised their enforcement powers. Of course, the exercise of
enforcement powers is not unrelated to the directives that are given,
but we also recognize that frontline officials exercise a degree of
discretion in how they exercise their powers and thus outcomes are
not entirely reducible to the directives issued. 33 The result, we argue,
is an extreme compliance enforcement regime that limits the ability
of investigators to determine whether violations have occurred. In
the Discussion section below, we turn to the enforcement literature to
explain why such an orientation is a matter of concern.
(i)

Design Flaws

The enforcement system's design has both positive and negative
features. A positive feature is that it builds in a role for proactive
inspections, an important feature in a context in which migrant workers are likely to be particularly reluctant to complain because of the

33

See Eric Tucker et al, "Making or Administering Law and Policy? Discretion
and Judgement in Employment Standards Enforcement in Ontario" (2016) 31:1

CJLS 65 at 66.
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fear of retaliation and ultimately deportation. 4 Inspections may be
triggered where an officer has "reason to suspect" that the employer
has not complied with the conditions described above, where the
employer has not complied with those conditions in the past, and as
part of a random verification of compliance. 5 ESDC's policy manual
on inspections (henceforth "the Inspections manual") elaborates
on these. With regard to "reason to suspect," the manual lists multiple sources of information, including tips from the public (ESDC
operates a "tip line"), other federal sources, non-governmental
organizations (including unions), provincial/territorial government
agencies, and the media.3 6 In the case of known past non-compliance,
the Inspections manual indicates that an employer may be selected
for inspection at the discretion of staff and based on the nature and
severity of the infraction. Random selection is generated using an
algorithm whose model aims to provide representative samples and
sorting by region, sector, and occupational type. 37
Once an inspection is triggered, the new regulations empower
Integrity Services Investigators ("investigators") to exercise broad
powers to gather information. However, under the new system, an
inspection does not require an on-site investigation. To the contrary, the Inspections manual makes it clear that an on-site visit is
optional, and it specifies when an on-site inspection is required: to
ensure worker safety, to verify conditions if required, and to limit

34 See generally Sarah G Marsden, Enforcing Exclusion: PrecariousMigrants and
the Law in Canada(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2018)) at 75; Leah F Vosko, "Rights
without Remedies: Enforcing Employment Standards in Ontario by Maximizing
Voice among Workers in Precarious Jobs" (2013) 50:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 845
at 857 [Vosko, "Rights without Remedies"]; Catherine Barnard, Amy Ludlow
& Sarah Fraser Butlin, "Beyond Employment Tribunals: Enforcement of
Employment Rights by EU-8 Migrant Workers" (2018) 47:2 Ind Law J 226 at
242; David Weil & Amanda Pyles, "Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance,
and the Problem of Enforcement in the US Workplace" (2006) 27:1 Comp Lab L
& Pol'y J 59 at 83.
35 See IRPR, supra note 23, ss 209.3(1), 209.5.
36 Employment & Social Development Canada, Integrity Operations Manual:
Chapter 63b - Temporary Foreign Worker Program (Ottawa, 2018) [ESDC
A], provided in response to a request under the Access to Information Act, RSC
1985, c A-1, s 4.1 [Access to InformationAct].
37 ESDC A, supranote 36, ss 9.1-3.
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employer misrepresentation. 38 The manual indicates that the investigator will consult with the Team Leader prior to determining that one
is required, implying that on-site inspections are the exception, rather
than the norm. 39 We examine the frequency of on-site inspections
below, but the implication that paper-based inspections will normally
suffice itself suggests a light-touch enforcement orientation, since
on-site inspections would be necessary in order to take stronger
enforcement actions.
This light-touch orientation becomes more explicit in the manual's set of principles to guide the conduct of inspections. The first
principle is that investigators are to "[b]e remedial, rather than adversarial: work with employers during the inspection to educate them
about their responsibilities under the IRPR and assist them to comply
with TFWP conditions."4 0 Other principles involve transparency,
freedom from bias and adherence to the "precautionary principle"
so as to prevent avoidable harm, and use of the "newspaper test"
to establish whether an enforcement action, if publicized, would be
judged ethical. It is unclear, however, whether these principles tilt
toward vigorous enforcement to avoid harm to migrant workers and
embarrassing critiques of government inaction, or toward restrained
enforcement to avoid harm to employers and embarrassing critiques
of governmental overreach.
Inspection outcomes are classified as either "satisfactory,"
"satisfactory with justification," "satisfactory with justification and
compensation," or "non-compliant." 4 1 On finding that an employer
has breached the regulatory conditions, the investigator must provide a "notice of preliminary finding" to the employer, to which the
employer has 30 days to respond. As in other regimes, employers may
respond by contesting the alleged facts. However, and further emphasizing the compliance orientation of the regime, the regulations also

38
39
40
41

Ibid, s 11.8.
Ibid, s 11.9.
Ibid, s 5.
Ibid, s 12; Employment & Social Develpoment Canada, Policy: Employer
Inspection And Determination Of Consequences (Ottawa, 2018) [ESDC B],
provided in response to a request under the Access to Information Act, supra
note 36.

MIGRANT WORKERS' LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA

87

provide that the employer may provide a justification for the breach.42
The regulation lists seven acceptable justifications. These include a
change in federal or provincial law, an error in interpretation made
in good faith (with compensation if workers were short-changed), an
unintentional accounting or administrative error (again, with compensation), and force majeure (i.e., an unforeseeable circumstance that
prevents a person from fulfilling a contract).43
Despite the generality of acceptable justifications in the regulation, in Obeid Farmsv. Canada(Obeid),4 4 the Federal Court held:
[T]he justification provisions must be strictly interpreted . . . . The intention
of Parliament in enacting these provisions was to prevent abuse of highly vulnerable temporary foreign workers, given the tenuous circumstances of their
employment which lack the normal safeguards preventing abuse otherwise
45
available to most Canadian workers.

However, as we shall see, the practice of enforcement does not necessarily follow the Court's admonition, but arguably is more in line
with the regulation's compliance orientation.
If the employer does not provide an acceptable justification, the
employer is non-compliant and liable to sanctions. We will say more
about sanctions in our examination of the practice of enforcement,
but note that few employers are sanctioned, and when they are, the
penalties tend to be on the lighter side of the range.
Investigators receive direction with respect to the enforcement
of each of the three protective obligations: compliance with the offer
of employment, compliance with applicable labour and employment
laws, and the duty to take reasonable steps to provide an abuse-free
workplace. With regard to the first obligation, on a positive note,
the directions make it clear that an employer cannot substitute one
condition for another. For example, the employer cannot substitute
increased compensation for health insurance if the job offer/LMIA
included a requirement to provide health insurance. 46

42
43
44
45
46

ESDC B, supra note 41, s 5; ESDC A, supra note 37, ss 209.993-4.
ESDC A, supranote 36, ss 209.3(3), 203(1.1).
Obeid Farmsv Canada,2017 FC 302 [Obeid].
Ibid at para 31.
See Employment & Social Development Canada, Access to Information Request,
A-2018-02770 (Ottawa, 2018) [ESDC C].
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On the other hand, investigators are directed to defer to housing
inspectors with regard to on-site worker housing, which is a major
source of complaints by migrant agricultural workers whose job offers
address this issue. 47 As a result, no new inspection resources are made
available to increase the detection of housing violations. At worst, an
employer who is found by provincial or municipal authorities to have
provided substandard housing will be subject to immigration law penalties, in addition to those prescribed by provincial or local law.
A similar problem arises in regard to enforcing the duty to comply with applicable employment laws. Federal investigators do not
independently determine whether an employer has violated such laws.
Rather, they only determine whether the employer has been found to
be in violation by the federal/provincial/territorial authority primarily
responsible for the law's enforcement. 48 The federal enforcement system, therefore, does not increase the likelihood that violators will be
detected; rather, it creates additional potential liabilities for employers caught violating applicable statutory labour rights. As a result, the
enforcement of workplace laws under the inspection system is only as
good as those primary enforcement regimes.
Finally, with regard to the employer's duty to "make reasonable
efforts to provide a workplace that is free of abuse," 49 the regulations
define "abuse" broadly:
For
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

the purpose of this Part abuse consists of any of the following:
physical abuse, including assault and forcible confinement;
sexual abuse, including sexual contact without consent;
psychological abuse, including threats and intimidation; and
financial abuse, including fraud and extortion."

47 See generally Adam J Perry, "Living at Work and Intra-Worker Sociality Among
Migrant Farm Workers in Canada" (2018) 19:4 JIMI 1021 at 1034; Adrian
Smith, "The Bunk House Rules: A Materialist Approach to Legal Consciousness
in the Context of Migrant Workers' Housing in Ontario" (2015) 52:3 Osgoode
Hall LJ 863 at 877; Patricia Tomic, Ricardo Trumper & Luis LM Aguiar,
"Housing Regulations and Living Conditions of Mexican Migrant Workers in
the Okanagan Valley, BC" (2010) Canadian Issues 78 at 82.
48 See ESDC A, supra note 36, ss 5.4, 11.17.vi.
49 IRPR, supra note 23, s 209.3(1)(a)(v).
50 Ibid, s 196.2.
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"Reasonable efforts" is not a defined term in the regulations, but the
policy manual identifies criteria to determine whether reasonable
efforts have been made, namely:
-

-

The employer had made general efforts to prevent workplace
abuse;
The employer, or anyone in a supervisory role or acting on the
employer's behalf, has not actively participated in abuse, including failing to stop abuse of which it had knowledge; and
Where an allegation or incident of abuse occurred, steps were
taken by the employer to address abuse and prevent it from happening again."

The manual provides examples of how an employer could prove
compliance with this requirement, including disclosing its policies
and procedures regarding abuse, demonstrating its efforts to inform
and educate employees of the policies and procedures, and demonstrating its ongoing commitment to provide a work environment that
is free from abuse and violence. The manual also states that policies
may vary, and smaller employers need not have specific policies at
all. Nevertheless, all employers "must make efforts to treatemployees,
including TFWs, in a fair and abusefree mannerand to take steps to
provide a work environmentthat isfree of abuse and violence."5 2

While the focus is on "reasonable efforts" to provide an abusefree workplace, the manual suggests investigators may also become
involved where allegations of actual abuse are being made.53 For
example, although investigators do not have authority to inspect
workers' bodies, they are directed to look for signs of physical confinement or abuse, such as "bruises, blood, and intimidated workers." 54 In regard to sexual abuse, they are to look for signs such as
"intimate relations between workers or between workers and management, erotic literature, photographs and/or websites in the workplace,
trafficking in persons."55 The policy also discusses when the employer

51
52
53
54

ESDC A, supranote 36, s 14.10.i.
Ibid, s 14.10.ii [emphasis in original].
See ESDC B, supra note 41, s 5.2.2.
Ibid, s 15.

55 Ibid.
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will be considered actively responsible for the abuse, including where
the employer or its agent have directly abused a worker, where "it is
more likely than not" that the employer or its agent directed, encouraged, or supported abuse, where there is evidence that the employer
protected the abuser, and where the employer has placed an employee
who has been convicted of abuse in contact with a migrant worker.56
Either way, the regulation ultimately is concerned with whether
the employer has made "reasonable efforts," not with whether it has
succeeded in providing an abuse-free workplace. But how is the failure to make reasonable efforts to be demonstrated in the absence of
evidence that abuse has occurred? The manual directs investigators
to consider various indicators of the employer's preventive efforts, 7
but as a result of the Federal Court judgment in Obeid, it is unclear
what evidence would satisfy a court. In that case, the Minister found
the employer to be non-compliant on multiple grounds, including
failing to make reasonable efforts to provide a workplace free of
abuse. On review, the Federal Court quashed the "reasonable efforts"
finding. 58 On the one hand, the Court emphasized that the duty is to
make reasonable efforts, not to provide an abuse-free workplace, and
so rejected the employer's argument that there must be evidence of
actual abuse to support a finding that "no reasonable efforts" were
made. 59 On the other, the Court also suggested that in the absence
of evidence of actual abuse, it might be very difficult to prove the
employer failed to make reasonable efforts. The fact that an employer
had no policies in place to prevent abuse was not sufficient evidence
of its failure to make reasonable efforts. The Court explained:
Reasonableness is a highly, and indeed, almost entirely contextual standard
.... Evidence of reasonableness often is based on the norms of other persons
in similar circumstances .... The Court's sense is that other small farming
TFW employers might have interpreted this provision in a similar fashion, not
really knowing what the requirement really entailed other than assuring no
abuse was occurring. 60

56 Ibid, s 16.
57 See IRPR, supra note 23, ss 209.2(4) & 209.3(4).
58 Obeid, supra note 44 at para 54.

59 Ibid.
60 Ibid atpara 56.

MIGRANT WORKERS' LABOUR RIGHTS IN CANADA

91

We consider the impact of these confusing directions on the practice
of enforcement of the "reasonable efforts" requirement below.
(ii)

The Practiceof Enforcement

To examine the practice of enforcement, we obtained statistics from ESDC on inspection and outcomes. When the inspection
program started, paper-based reviews were by far the most frequent;
however, on-site inspections became more frequent in subsequent
years. In the first six months of 2018-19 (the most recent year for
which data are available), around 55% were on-site. A consequence
of the shift from paper reviews to on-site inspections has been a
reduction in the number of completed inspections annually. In 201617, 3,666 inspections were completed, but in 2017-18, the number
dropped to 2,888, and for 2018-19, only 867 inspections were completed at the end of six months. 61 If this trend continues, there will be
fewer than 2,000 for 2018-19.
In terms of inspection results, Table 1 divides the outcomes of
all completed inspections over the three complete years for which
we have data (2015-16 to 2017-18) into four categories: satisfactory, compliant with intervention, non-compliant, and awaiting final
adjudication. ESDC considers "compliant with intervention" identical
to the category of "satisfactory with justification/restitution" found in
the Inspections manual. Therefore, we must assume that investigators who initially determined non-compliance, to which employers
responded with sufficient justification, have reported these as satisfactory or satisfactory with justification (compliant with intervention).
The most frequent outcome was satisfactory (about 40%), followed by compliant with intervention (about 36%), awaiting final
adjudication (about 20%), and non-compliant (about 4%) (see
Table 1). We calculate the percentage of employers who were found
non-compliant in the first instance by adding together the categories "non-compliant" and "compliant with interventivon" and divide
that by the number of completed inspections less those awaiting final
adjudication. The result is that nearly 50% of employers were found
to be non-compliant in the first instance; however, about 90% of the

61

See ESDC C, supra note 46.
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employers found to be non-compliant offered a justification (with
restitution when required) that was accepted by the investigator. Only
10% of employers found non-compliant in the first instance were
ultimately cited as non-compliant (361 out of 3,948) (see Table 1).
TABLE 1
Outcomes of Completed Inspections, By Inspection
Type and Totals, 2015-16 to 2017-18
On-Site:

Paper:

Total:

Number (%)

Number (%)

Number (%)

Satisfactory

438 (46%)

3,646 (40%)

4,044 (40%)

Compliant with Intervention

460 (48%)

3,127 (35%)

3,587 (36%)

9 (1%)

352 (4%)

361 (4%)

Non-Compliant
Awaiting Adjudication

43 (5%)

1,923 (21%)

1,966 (20%)

950 (100%)

9,048 (100%)

9,998 (100%)

Source: ESDC, Access to Information Request A-2018-02770.

Unfortunately, data are not available on the reasons why employers were found non-compliant in the first instance. This is an important lacuna since it prevents us from determining the extent to which
inspections are targeting the protective aspects of the regulations as
opposed to the protectionist ones. We also do not have data specifying
the accepted justifications in cases of initial non-compliance. These,
too, are important, since their analysis would allow us to better understand how this supposedly narrow exception is being interpreted to
excuse 90% of the non-compliance detected in the first instance.
Nevertheless, the high rate at which justifications for violations
are accepted by investigators provides strong evidence of a compliance orientation. Investigators imbued with a compliance orientation
will likely be open to accepting claims that violations were good faith
errors, or unintentional accounting or administrative mistakes, notwithstanding the judicial pronouncement in Obeid that justifications
should be strictly construed.
What do we know about the small percentage of employers
found to be non-compliant? The Canadian government maintains a
public list of non-compliant employers, which as of 17 April 2019
contained 149 names. The list is compiled from both ESDC (TFWs)
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and IRCC (IMP) inspections and includes employers who were found
non-compliant under the ECR review process. Our analysis of IRCC
enforcement data from 2015-16 to 2017-18 shows that a total of 17
employers were found non-compliant. Therefore, we can assume
that the great majority of employers listed as non-compliant are from
ESDC inspections or ECR reviews of employers of TFWs. In 53 of
the 149 cases, no reason is provided because the non-compliance
occurred before the new regulations came into force in December
2015. That leaves 96 employers who were found non-compliant on
inspection and for whom we have reasons.
Some of these employers were found to be non-compliant for
more than one reason, and so the total number of reasons given (122)
exceeds the number of non-compliant employers. 62 Table 2 identifies
the reasons given by year and by category. 63 Administrative reasons
include such things as failing to keep or provide an investigator with
requested documents or failing to attend a meeting or inspection.
LMIA enforcement refers to the enforcement of provisions related
to the protectivist requirements such as those related to the job
description or the obligation to create new jobs or improve skills
for Canadians. Unfortunately, compliance with LMIA conditions
blends protection and protectivist concerns; thus, it is impossible to
know whether employers were found non-compliant for a workplace
rights violation or for failing to employ the migrant worker in the job
described in the LMIA.
Table 2 provides several interesting insights. First, the number of employers who were found non-compliant increased dramatically in 2019; however, this data must be approached cautiously
since it is based on the year of decision, not the year of violation,
and a great many employers (40) were added to the non-compliance
list in January of 2019. Thus, it is impossible to discern whether the
increase in 2019 reflects the resolution of some kind of bureaucratic
glitch in processing cases or a real increase over time in the number
of employers being found non-compliant.
62 See Immigration, Refugees & Citizenship Canada, "Employers who have
been non-compliant" (last visited 17 April 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/
en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/employers-noncompliant.html>.
63 We constructed the 6 categories from the 17 reasons reported in the data.

0
TABLE 2
Reasons for Finding of Non-Compliance by Year of Decision and Type of Violation
Applicable

Working

~r
Total

Year of
Decision

Administrative
Reason

LMIA
Enforcement

Workplace
Law

Abuse-Free
Workplace

Conditionsor
Job Description

Live-In
Caregiver

2019(to
17 April)

51

5

0

0

11

0

67

2018

12

5

1

0

12

0

30

2017

6

1

0

0

17

0

24

Reasons
Given

2016

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

Total

70

11

1

0

40

0

122

r

Source: Government of Canada, Immigration and Citizenship, "Employers who have been non-compliant" (accessed 17 April 2019),
online: <https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/employers-non-compliant.html>.
NJ
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Second, with regard to the reasons why employers are found
non-compliant, Table 2 shows that nearly half of the reasons relate
to administrative matters (70), the most common by far being the
failure to provide the investigator with requested documents. The
fact that this is the most common reason for employers being cited
for non-compliance, rather than a substantive labour rights violation,
further supports the conclusion that the enforcement system is heavily
compliance-oriented, where non-cooperation with the investigator
is taken very seriously and cannot, unlike substantive labour rights
violations, be justified.
Third, only one employer has been found non-compliant
because of its failure to comply with applicable protective employment laws. This is not a surprising result since, as we noted earlier,
federal investigators do not make an independent determination of
whether a violation has occurred; they depend on the provincial/
territorial authorities with primary enforcement jurisdiction. Such an
approach is problematic because studies have shown that statutory
labour rights are poorly enforced generally, and that enforcement
for precariously employed workers, and TFWs in particular, is especially fraught. 64 In effect, the federal enforcement system, which was
called into existence in large measure because of the failure of primary enforcement to protect migrant workers against rights' violations, has been implemented to make it structurally dependent on the
flawed enforcement system it is supposed to ameliorate, and almost
no additional sanctions are imposed if such violations do come to the
attention of the investigator.
Finally, no employer has been found non-compliant with its
duty to make reasonable efforts to provide an abuse-free workplace.
It is possible that investigators have found employers non-compliant
in the first instance and that employers have offered acceptable justifications for their failure to do so, but that would mean that justifications were accepted in all such instances. The more likely explanation
for the absence of employers that are ultimately found non-compliant
is that, since the judgment in Obeid, investigators lack guidance as to
what non-compliance means in a world in which the lack of positive
efforts by the employer to prevent abuse does not provide a sufficient

64 See Vosko, "Rights without Remedies," supra note 34 at 851-852.
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basis for finding the employer failed to make reasonable efforts. In
effect, the Court has made the positive duty to take reasonable efforts
unenforceable, and instead transformed the provision into a due diligence defence that an employer can raise if there is a finding that
abuse occurred: "But I made reasonable efforts .... " The Court
implicitly recognized this result and invited the Minister to consider whether it would be advisable to make it clear what proactive
measures were expected of employers, but no action has been taken
to date. 65
In terms of consequences, 54 employers were suspended from
the program, in most cases for two years (see Table 3). Suspensions
were more common in the first years of the program, when more than
half of non-compliant employers were suspended. Only three suspensions were imposed in the first 3 1/2 months of 2019, suggesting that
there has been a turn away from suspensions.
TABLE 3
Penalties Imposed on Non-Compliant
Employers by Year of Decision
Total Number
of Non-Compliant
Year of
Final

Number of

Employers (Number
Non- Complaint

Number of
Employers

Number of
Employers

Employers
Finedand

Decision

with ECR)

Fined

Suspended

Suspended

2019 (to
17 April)

54(3)

51

3

0

2018

47(23)

22

24

1

2017

46(26)

19

26

1

2016

2(1)

1

1

0

149 (53)

93

54

2

Total

Source: Government of Canada, Immigration and Citizenship, "Employers who
have been non-compliant" (accessed 17 April 2019), online: <https://www.canada.
ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/work-canada/employers-noncompliant.html>.

65

See Obeid, supra note 44 at para 59.
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One reason for not suspending employers from the program is a
concern about the impact on the TFWs who would be at risk of deportation unless they can find another employer who has, or can obtain,
an LMIA. To address this problem, the regulations were amended in
the summer of 2019 to allow TFWs to obtain open work permits if
they can demonstrate that they are "at risk of abuse." 66 This provision
may encourage workers to report abuse and reduce the reluctance to
suspend employers guilty of abuse; however, to date no employer has
been found non-compliant because of its failure to make reasonable
efforts to prevent abuse.
When employers are fined, the level of the fine is usually low,
in the $1,000 to $3,000 range. One company, Kameron Coal in Nova
Scotia, was fined $54,000 (and received a one-year suspension), but
that was truly exceptional. The next highest fine was for $16,000,
imposed on two companies: Harbour Sushi in British Columbia and
Mozza Vera Foods in Quebec. Below these, the next highest fines are
$4,000 or less.

4.

DISCUSSION

The federal enforcement system imposes a condition of hiring
migrant workers that employers comply with legislated labour standards and the terms of migrant workers' contracts, as well as requiring employers to make "reasonable efforts" to ensure workplaces are
free of abuse. The system is promising insofar as it seeks to respond
to a widely acknowledged rights shortfall, and integrates labour standards into federal regulatory control of labour migration. However,
the protective potential of the inspection system is not being realized.
At the outset of this study, we identified four enforcement
models: deterrence, compliance, responsive regulation, and strategic
enforcement. Here we return to consider which of these models the
current practice of federal enforcement most closely resembles and
the problems we see associated with this approach.

66 Immigration, Refugees & Citizenship Canada, "Open Work Permits For
Vulnerable Workers" (last visited 4 June 2019), online: <www.canada.ca/en/
immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/publications-manuals/operationalbulletins-manuals/temporary-residents/foreign-workers/vulnerable-workers.html>.
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It is clear that the federal enforcement regime is not based on
a deterrence model. Instead, consistent with its provincial counterparts' approach to employment standards enforcement, the federal
government has adopted an extreme version of the compliance model
of enforcement. Our data show that employers are rarely cited for
non-compliance for violations of migrant workers' workplace
rights despite the fact that nearly half of all inspected employers are
found to be non-compliant in the first instance. Rather, most noncompliance is excused on the basis of employer justification and restitution to workers if they have been short-changed. While supporters
of the compliance model argue that it is an effective and efficient
way of protecting workers' rights, 67 studies of the enforcement of
other statutory labour rights, such as the Employment StandardsAct
(ESA) of Ontario, contradict the assumptions on which the compliance model is built and thus raise serious concerns about the efficacy of compliance-based approaches. 68 Moreover, the compliance
orientation of this new system is deeply rooted in the history of the
enforcement of protective labour law, which has proven to result in
significant enforcement gaps. 69
We have also considered the possibility that the current
inspection regime embodies some of the principles of responsive
regulation or strategic enforcement, outlined in the Introduction.

67 See Paul Almond & Garry C Gray, "Frontline Safety: Understanding the
Workplace as a Site of Regulatory Engagement" (2017) 39:1 Law & Pol'y 5 at 7;
Gunningham, "Enforcement," supra note 16.
68 See Eric Tucker et al, "Carrying Little Sticks: Is there a 'Deterrence Gap' in
Employment Standards Enforcement in Ontario, Canada?" (2019) 35:1 Int'l J
Comp Lab L & Ind Rel 1 at 15 [Tucker, "Carrying Little Sticks"]; John Grundy
et al, "Enforcement of Ontario's Employment Standards Act: The Impact of
Reforms" (2017) 43:3 Can Public Pol'y 190 at 193; Leah F Vosko et al, "The
Compliance Model of Employment Standards Enforcement: An Evidence-based
Assessment of its Efficacy in Instances of Wage Theft" (2017) 48:3 Indus Rel LJ
256 at 257.
69 See generally WG Carson, "The Conventionalization of Early Factory Crime"
(1979) 7:1 Int'l J Soc Law 37; Richard Johnstone "Occupational Health and
Safety Prosecutions in Victoria: An Historical Study" (2000) 13:2 Austl J Lab L
113; Eric Tucker, AdministeringDangerin the Workplace: The Law and Politics
of Regulation in Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1990) at 127-130.
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Yet it is hard to fit the practice of federal enforcement into the
responsive regulation model. First, based on our earlier studies of
violations of Ontario's ESA, the 90% rate at which inspectors accept
justifications from employers found to be non-compliant in the first
instance suggests an unrealistically rosy view of employers of TFWs,
even within a responsive regulation frame. 70 Second, investigators do
not have a range of tools that allow for incremental escalation when
violations are detected. For example, they do not have the power
to issue compliance orders, a common feature of most inspection
regimes. Third, it is not clear that the federal inspectorate has the
resources to routinely re-inspect employers who have been found
non-compliant in the first instance to determine whether they have
become and remain compliant. Finally, there is little evidence that
the hammer of deterrence is brought down often or hard enough to
produce a pyramid of enforcement that rises much above the broad
horizon of forgiven non-compliance.
It is similarly difficult to characterize federal enforcement as
consistent with the strategic enforcement model, also described
earlier.7 1 Unlike responsive regulation, the theory does not build on
general assumptions about the character of employers, but rather
is concerned with the context in which employers operate and the
systemic pressures that tempt employers to violate protective labour
laws in order to make a profit. In contrast to compliance and responsive regulation approaches, strategic enforcement supports the use of
carefully crafted, highly publicized deterrence measures intended to
ensure that employers unequivocally know in advance that the costs
of violating employment standards are likely to be higher than its
benefits. This strategic crafting is crucial in precisely those contexts
where employers may be under pressure to violate the laws. To that
end, Weil makes a number of concrete suggestions. For example,
civil monetary penalties should be routinely assessed, especially for

70 See Leah F Vosko et al, Closing the Enforcement Gap: Improving Employment
Standards Protectionsfor People in PrecariousJobs (Toronto: University of
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repeat offenders. Weil also recommends an increased use of liquidated damage awards, which compensate workers for the additional
losses they suffer when they do not get paid what they are owed, but
which are likely to be viewed by employers as deterrence measures
because they pay more than the amount saved by violating the law.
While there is evidence that the federal enforcement regime prioritizes inspections through its use of an algorithm to select employers for proactive inspections, it does not appear that it embraces other
elements of strategic enforcement. Certainly at the level of deterrence,
investigators do not have the power routinely to impose civil penalties when they find employers have failed to pay TFWs what they are
owed, and workers are not compensated for the losses they suffer as a
result of not being paid on time. Moreover, there is no indication that
the federal enforcement regime has the resources or the mandate to
achieve systemic effects by, for example, reaching agreements with
major purchasers of agricultural products not to buy from farms that
fail to comply with the federal enforcement requirements.
In short, in our view, the federal enforcement program most
closely resembles an extreme compliance model, notwithstanding the
lack of support for such an approach in the literature.
The extreme compliance orientation of the federal government
is exacerbated by its interaction with the primary enforcement of protective labour laws by provincial/territorial governments. Given the
well-documented barriers migrant workers face in accessing provincial employment standards remedies, and the fact that such remedies
are not always well designed to account for the particular vulnerabilities confronting migrant workers, an effective federal system would
respond to these weaknesses. In this regard, however, the federal system also fails. Federal investigators are not authorized to take action
unless provincial authorities have found non-compliance, and so they
add no additional resources to the detection of violations. At best, the
threat of federal enforcement increases the potential consequences for
those caught violating statutory labour rights.
Finally, the current judicial interpretation of the requirement
to make reasonable efforts to prevent workplace abuse renders this
provision ineffective. In the absence of a finding of actual abuse, it
appears almost impossible to hold an employer non-compliant for
failing to make reasonable efforts to prevent it. In effect, the "make
reasonable efforts" provision does not impose a meaningful duty on
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employers to take positive proactive measures, but rather provides
employers with a due diligence defence in the event abuse occurs.

5.

CONCLUSION

Arguably, the most logical response to the exploitation of
migrant workers is to change the structures of vulnerability that elevate their risk.7 2 Replacing employer-tied, time-limited work permits
with open work permits and pathways to permanency for migrants
who provide necessary labour would do much to resolve these issues.
Furthermore, migration status security would likely reduce migrant
workers' reluctance to use existing rights mechanisms.
Barring structural change of this order, reforms to the existing
federal enforcement system should address the three major shortfalls
we identified. First, the federal enforcement regime needs to move
away from the extreme compliance model it currently practices and
embrace a strategic enforcement model. This reform would require
changes to regulatory design and enforcement practices. For example,
at the design level, investigators need to be given the power to issue
compliance orders and to impose monetary penalties where violations are detected, particularly where employers did not pay workers what they were owed. At the practice level, investigators should
be instructed to comply with the dictum of the court in Obeid that
justifications should be accepted only in very limited circumstances.
Thought should also be given to identifying and developing working
relationships with strategic partners, such as farm worker advocacy
organizations, that can provide information on sites of violations that
might otherwise go unnoticed, or with purchasers of farm products
who might use their influence to help regulate growers. 73
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Second, in addition to addressing the deficiencies of the current
compliance model, any reforms should reconsider the role of investigators in enforcing provincial/territorial minimum standards. As we
saw, currently investigators cannot make an independent determination that violations have occurred, meaning that federal enforcement resources are not supplementing provincial/territorial ones. This
limitation likely explains why the federal enforcement system never
finds the employers whom it inspects to be non-compliant with these
laws. The division of powers under federalism may play a role here.
However, if the federal enforcement regime is to contribute meaningfully to the protection of the labour rights of TFWs, it will be
necessary to put in place agreements requiring provincial authorities
to communicate violations to federal enforcement officials. These
officials should be given the power to determine whether provincial
standards have been violated and to treat these as violations of the
employer's immigration law obligations.
Finally, there needs to be a rethinking of how to enforce the
employer's duty to take reasonable efforts to prevent workplace
abuse. As we have seen, no employer has been held non-compliant
for failing to make reasonable efforts. This coheres with the decision in Obeid that taking no proactive measures is not evidence of a
failure to make reasonable efforts to prevent abuse. The regulations
have to be amended to require employers to take proactive measures
to prevent abuse, and to include specific direction as to the actions
employers must take to achieve this result. These regulations should
be evidence-based and developed in consultation with workers and
advocacy organizations to produce meaningful requirements that go
beyond pro forma compliance gestures (such as "workers' safety"
posters), and should be paired with effective enforcement measures to
fulfill the promise of abuse-free workplaces.

